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A Curious Italian Supreme Court Decision on
Cross-Border Dividend Distributions
by Roberto Succio
In Decision No. 4600 of February 26, the Italian
Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) considered the
tax treaty entitlement of a Japanese fund in relation to
dividends distributed by Italian companies via a U.S.
limited liability partnership. The rationale behind the
Supreme Court’s decision is unusual and reveals an
interpretation of the relevant tax treaties that may be
criticized from an OECD model convention perspec-
tive.
The case was submitted by a Japanese fund (the
Fund) controlling a U.S. limited liability partnership
(U.S. LLP), which in turn held participations in Italian
companies. Dividends distributed by the Italian compa-
nies were subject to the domestic (at that time 32.4
percent) withholding tax, and the Fund claimed a re-
fund of the difference between the withholding tax and
the reduced 15 percent withholding tax granted by ar-
ticle 10 of the Italy-Japan tax treaty.
Currently, according to the domestic provisions,
dividends distributed to nonresident entities are ordi-
narily subject to a 27 percent withholding tax (save for
the possibility to claim a refund of up to four-ninths of
the withholding tax if the recipient can show that it
has paid a final tax on the same dividends). However,
the Finance Bill of 2008 introduced a reduced 1.375
percent rate for dividends paid to entities subject to
ordinary corporate tax in their home state that are resi-
dent in European Union or European Economic Area
‘‘white-list’’ states. The 1.375 percent rate applies irre-
spective of compliance with the conditions required
under the EU parent-subsidiary directive.
The line of reasoning adopted by the Fund was as
follows: Dividends distributed by the Italian companies
to U.S. LLP did not benefit from the reduced withhold-
ing tax granted by the Italy-U.S. tax treaty since U.S.
LLP, as a limited liability partnership, was not entitled
to the application of the U.S. tax treaty. However, the
Fund was qualified as the ‘‘beneficial owner’’ of the
dividends according to article 10 of the Italy-Japan tax
treaty. This allowed it to benefit from the application of
the reduced 15 percent withholding tax.
According to article 10, paragraph 2 of the Italy-
Japan tax treaty:
dividends may be taxed in the Contracting State
of which the company paying the dividends is a
resident, and according to the law of that Con-
tracting State, but the tax so charged shall not
exceed: (a) 10 percent of the gross amount of the
dividends if the recipient is a company which
owns at least 25 percent of the voting shares of
the company paying such dividends during the
period of six months immediately before the end
of the accounting period for which the distribu-
tion of profits takes place; (b) in all other cases,
15 percent of the gross amount of the dividends.
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The tax administration rejected the refund request,
and after conflicting rulings of the tax courts, the Fund
appealed to the Supreme Court.
In particular, the Fund appealed against the tax
court of first instance (Commissione Tributaria Provin-
ciale) that accepted its claim. The Tax Office in turn
appealed the tax court decision to the tax court of sec-
ond instance (Commissione Tributaria Regionale),
which accepted its petition.
Literal Interpretation
The Supreme Court rejected the Fund’s request
based on a literal interpretation of the Italy-Japan tax
treaty.
Article 10, paragraph 2 of the treaty does not con-
tain the normal beneficial ownership clause. According
to this provision, the reduced taxation of dividends in
the state of source is granted only to the beneficial
owner of the dividend payments.
The Supreme Court ruled that the reduced with-
holding tax provided under the Italy-Japan tax treaty
applies only when the actual recipient is a resident of
the contracting state (in our example, Japan), irrespec-
tive of who the beneficial owner of the relevant pay-
ments is.
Here, dividends were actually distributed by the Ital-
ian companies to U.S. LLP, a U.S. partnership; conse-
quently, the Italy-Japan tax treaty does not apply and
the Fund, regardless of whether it’s the beneficial
owner of the distributions, was not entitled to benefit
from the reduced Italian withholding tax provided un-
der the treaty.
The decision was surprising to most tax practi-
tioners, and it clearly will give rise to difficulties when
dividends are paid to transparent entities.
The Italian tax authorities and courts have moved
from a formalistic approach, which focused on the le-
gal form of a transaction to determine its tax conse-
quences, to a substance-over-form approach, according
to which the tax treatment of a transaction should be
dictated by its real juridical and economic substance. In
pursuing the new approach, Italian courts and tax ad-
ministration often referred to international tax prin-
ciples and antiabuse doctrines elaborated at the EU tax
law level as relevant authorities, and sometimes to the
OECD commentary suggestions.
This time, the Supreme Court ignored every contri-
bution of this kind in its decision.
‘Beneficial Owner’ in Italian Tax Law
Under Italian law, the concept of the beneficial
owner of income applies in four areas:
• tax treaties;
• the EU interest and royalties directive;
• the EU savings tax directive; and
• the domestic portfolio income exemption.1
Tax treaties limit the power of a contracting state to
tax dividends, interest, and royalties arising in that
state and paid to a resident of the other contracting
state by reducing or eliminating the tax that can be
charged by the first state. With few exceptions, Italian
tax treaties provide that relief from tax on Italian-
source dividends, interest, and royalties applies only if
the recipient of the income, or the person claiming the
treaty benefits, is the beneficial owner of the income
concerned, as well as a resident of the other contract-
ing state.
The EU directive on interest and royalties exempts
interest and royalty payments between associated com-
panies of EU member states (or their permanent estab-
lishments located in an EU member state) from tax in
the state in which the payment arises. The exemption
applies if the company (or its PE) claiming the benefit
is the beneficial owner of the payment. The EU direc-
tive on the taxation of savings income provides for a
system of information exchange between EU member
states, which ensures that an individual resident in a
member state is taxed in his state of residence on sav-
ings income in the form of interest earned from an-
other member state. The directive applies if the indi-
vidual receiving the income, being a resident of a
member state, is also the beneficial owner of the in-
come.
Italian tax law does not
contain a definition of
beneficial owner for
general tax or treaty
purposes.
Finally, Italian domestic tax law exempts nonresi-
dents from taxation in Italy on some items of Italian-
source portfolio income. The exemption applies to for-
eign persons who are residents of approved countries
(those that allow exchange of information with Italy
and are included on a special list), provided they are
the beneficial owners of the income for which the ex-
emption is claimed. Neither the Italian tax treaties in
force (with only one exception) nor the OECD model
convention contains a definition of beneficial owner.
1The Italian tax authority has faced the topic in the following
regulations: Ris. Min. 167/2008, Ris. Min. 86/2006, and Ris.
Min. 17/2006, available at http://www.finanze.it.
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In the absence of a definition in tax treaties, the
term ‘‘beneficial owner’’ should be interpreted accord-
ing to the domestic law of the country that applies the
treaty (that is, the source country), as provided for un-
der the typical tax treaty article 3, paragraph 2.
Italian tax law does not contain a definition of ben-
eficial owner for general tax or treaty purposes. This
concept is defined and used in other specific areas of
Italian tax law. The way in which it is defined in those
areas may affect the interpretation of the same term as
it applies in the treaty context.
The OECD Commentary
The commentary to the OECD model convention
revised in 2003 provides important clarifications on the
interpretation of the term ‘‘beneficial owner’’ as used
in tax treaties.
The OECD commentary directly links the concept
of beneficial ownership to possible abuses of tax trea-
ties. The beneficial ownership provision should be used
to deny treaty benefits in the form of elimination or
reduction of source-based withholding taxes on portfo-
lio income such as dividends, interest, and royalties
when nontreaty country taxpayers, who would not be
eligible for the treaty benefits, try to achieve them
through the use of legal arrangements that are per-
ceived as abusive or artificial.
In particular, according to the OECD commentary,
the beneficial owner requirement targets conduit or
back-to-back investments or financing arrangements
that purport to channel portfolio income payments
through intermediate entities established in treaty coun-
tries, so that taxpayers can claim a reduction or elimi-
nation of source-based withholding tax on those pay-
ments, which otherwise would not be due, if the
transaction had been consummated directly between
the original payer and the final payee of the income.
Finally, since the beneficial owner requirement is
applied as an antiavoidance provision, it interacts with
domestic antiabuse statutory provisions or judicial doc-
trines aimed at contrasting similar abuses outside tax
treaties. The way in which those antiabuse provisions
are interpreted is also important and likely to be re-
ferred to for determining the exact scope and meaning
of the treaty beneficial owner requirement.
Beneficial Ownership: A Linguistic Survey
The concept of beneficial ownership originates from
the common law and has no equivalent in civil law.
This can make the application of some provisions
somewhat problematic.
According to van Weeghel:
The term ‘‘beneficial owner’’ seems to have origi-
nated in the United Kingdom, particularly
through the development of trust law, under
which the term ‘‘beneficial owner’’ is used as dis-
tinguished from ‘‘legal ownership.’’ So, we can
assume that its archetype is the trust. In the
United Kingdom, however, this term is also used
also outside the trust context and in particularly
in the tax law of the United Kingdom.2
As regards this question, van Weeghel points out:
‘‘With the widespread use of the term ‘beneficial
owner,’ one would expect the term to have a clearly
defined meaning. Nothing, however, is further from the
truth.’’
The term ‘‘beneficial ownership’’ is used in common
law to distinguish the rights enjoyed by persons with a
beneficial interest in property from those enjoyed by
the legal titleholder to that property. It is a term de-
rived by the common-law ‘‘equity’’ regime.
According to the concept described above, the per-
son is entitled to enjoy the economic rights stemming
from the ownership although the ownership has been
registered in the name of someone else (the legal
owner). Accordingly, the legal owner holds the object
in his own name but on behalf of the beneficial owner.
Whether those beneficial rights constitute an actual
ownership right is the subject of much debate. Under
civil law, there is no such fragmentation of the right of
ownership. While dismemberments of ownership exist,
for example, usufruct, use, servitude, and emphyteusis,
these dismemberments limit or expand rights enjoyed
in property but do not convey ownership itself.3 Fur-
thermore, none of these dismemberments of the right
of ownership can be precisely analogized to the
common-law concept of beneficial ownership.
The beneficial owner is the indirect owner. There-
fore beneficial registration structures are known as indi-
rect holding, nominee registration, or omnibus holding
structures as opposed to the end-investor or direct hold-
ing structures.
Property law in civil law jurisdictions traditionally
lacked beneficial ownership structures.
A few terminological remarks regarding beneficial
owner can be useful for courts and the tax administra-
tion, not to mention taxpayers. I think that this kind of
knowledge and analysis could (and should) have driven
the Italian Supreme Court to a different decision in
this controversy.
Beneficial owner can be defined as the true owner of
a share, as opposed to any name in which it may be
legally held, and as ‘‘an owner who is entitled to the
possession and use of land or its income for his own
2S. van Weeghel, The Improper Use of Tax Treaties, Kluwer Law
International (1998), pp. 64-66. Van Weeghel quotes section 258
of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970.
3Oxford Dictionary of Law, 4th ed. (1997).
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benefit’’4; furthermore, it can be also described as ‘‘a
person even though legal title of the property belongs
to another person.’’5
First, this term is commonly translated into Italian
in different ways. According to the Inter-Active Termi-
nology for Europe,6 beneficial owner is the equivalent
English term of the Italian proprietario effettivo7 as well
as of beneficiario,8 and as beneficiario attivo.9 This term
can also be translated into Italian as simply propri-
etario.10
Second, from a linguistic perspective, we can assume
that the Italian equivalent terms have slight differences
in meaning. The Italian term for ‘‘owner’’ (proprietario)
indicates ‘‘whoever holds the enjoyment of ownership’’
(chi gode della proprietà di qualcosa) while the Italian term
for ‘‘beneficiary’’ (beneficiario) defines ‘‘whoever holds
the advantage of a judicial act’’ (chi gode i vantaggi di un
atto giuridico).11
Some interpreters also translate the English concept
of beneficial owner to the Italian expression ‘‘titolare
effettivo.’’12
Not surprisingly, all the definitions point out the
power to take advantage of the juridical situation.
Conclusion
There is an evolving multilateral consensus among
OECD member countries on the appropriate method
for source countries to follow to determine if they
should provide treaty benefits on items of income paid
to fiscally transparent entities. The question is very sen-
sitive when a conflict exists between the source and
residence states.
This consensus is described in greater detail in the
OECD report, ‘‘The Application of the OECD Model
Tax Convention to Partnerships,’’ which generally pro-
vides that a source state is required to grant treaty ben-
efits on income paid to an entity only if the income is
considered to be derived by a resident of a treaty part-
ner for purposes of the treaty partner’s tax laws.
Therefore, if a dividend paid by a corporation that
is a resident of one of the states (as determined under
article 4 (Residence)) is received by a nominee or agent
that is a resident of the other state on behalf of a per-
son that is not a resident of that other state, the divi-
dend is not entitled to the benefits of this article. How-
ever, a dividend received by a nominee on behalf of a
resident of that other state would be entitled to ben-
efits.
In this case there is no doubt that the Fund, in it-
self, was entitled.
These limitations are confirmed by paragraph 12 of
the OECD commentaries to article 10, stating:
12. Under paragraph 2, the limitation of tax in
the State of source is not available when an inter-
mediary, such as an agent or nominee, is inter-
posed between the beneficiary and the payer, un-
less the beneficial owner is a resident of the other
Contracting State.
The text of the model was amended in 1995 to
clarify this point, which has been the consistent posi-
tion of all member countries.13
In the present case, the Supreme Court has argued
that the reduced withholding tax provided under the
Italy-Japan tax treaty only applies when the actual re-
cipient is a resident of the contracting state (in this
case, Japan), regardless of who the beneficial owner of
the relevant payments is.
The premise is the right one, but the conclusion is
wrong.
Generally speaking, the concept is used by the tax
authorities as an antiavoidance provision; article 1 of
the Tax Code states that the income tax applies to the
‘‘possession’’ of income in enumerated categories. The
Italian term ‘‘possesso’’ as defined outside the tax law
means actual ownership as opposed to mere legal title.
This concept has been used to lift the veil on situa-
tions when the mere legal title is used for avoidance
purpose, not — as the Court did — to deny a benefit
in a situation when it had been allowed.
To conclude, we can state that all the rules in trea-
ties themselves can apply to limit eligibility for treaty
benefits regarding investment income. However, all the
rules have one primary focus. The recipient of the in-
come must be the true economic owner of the income
to qualify for treaty benefits. Thus, when structuring
investments with a hope to obtaining a treaty benefit,
the taxpayer must make sure that the recipient of the
income shows the proper amount of economic owner-
ship under these rules to qualify. ◆
4Id.
5Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd pocket ed. (2001), p. 508.
6The Inter-Active Terminology for Europe is the EU interin-
stitutional terminology database used for the collection, dissemi-
nation, and shared management of EU-specific terminology.
7Picchi, Il nuovo Economics & Business, Zanichelli (1999).
8Id.
9COM(98) 295 (2) OJ C 212/98 p. 15.
10Garzanti Linguistica, Dizionario Business English (2006).
11De Mauro, Dizionario della Lingua Italiana, available at http://
old.demauroparavia.it/.
12C. Licini, Normativa antiriciclaggio e attività notarile, Il ruolo del
notaio nel sistema europeo e nazionale di lotta al riciclaggio al denaro
criminale, IPSOA (2006), p. 197.
13See also para. 24 of the OECD commentaries to article 1
(Personal Scope).
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